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FREDERICK SCHAUER

CODIFYING THE
FIRST AMENDMENT:
NEW Y 0 RK v. FERBER

Words and pictures may serve an almost limitless variety of purposes. They may be the instruments with which a political pamphleteer urges a change in government policy, but they may also
enable the child pornographer to display for the sexual pleasure of
paying customers photographs of children engaged in sexual activity. The former is unquestionably at the core of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and press. 1 The latter is
equally clearly some distance from that core. 2 In New York v. Ferber3 the Supreme Court held child pornography to be so far from
the core as to be unprotected by the First Amendment. Ferber
Frederick Schauer is Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 437 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); MEIKLEJOH:-1, POLITICAL
FREEDm.t (1960); BeVier, The First Ame11dme11t a11d Political Speech: A11 l11quiry i11to the Substallce a11d Limits of Pri11ciple, 30 STA:-1. L. REV. 299 (1978); Blasi, The Checkit1g Value i11 First
Ammdmmt Theory, 1977 A.\1. B. Fot::-~o. RESEARCH). 521; Bark, Neutral Pri11ciples a11d Some
First Ammdmmt Problems, 47 1:-~o. L.J. 1 (1971 ); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note 011
"The Cmtral Mea11it1g of the First Ame11dmmt," 1964 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIEW 191.
2
"[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (plurality opinion). Doctrinal or strategic
considerations may lead us to treat all or part of the fringe as legally indistinguishable from
the core, but this is distinct from identifying a theoretical, prelegal core.
3 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
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upheld a New York statute4 proscribing the dissemination of child
pornography regardless of whether the materials were legally obscene under the Miller standards. 5 Moreover, the Court was unanimous in reaching that conclusion, 6 giving Ferber the distinction of
being one of very few cases since 1919 in which not a single Justice
dissented from a holding that an act of communication was unprotected by the First Amendment. 7
It would be easy to explain the Court's unanimity of result by
reference to the undeniably revolting nature of child pornography
and those who trade in it. 8 But this would be too easy. The Court's
development of First Amendment doctrine has long been influenced by a willingness to protect that which would, standing
alone, command little but condemnation. The course of the First
Amendment has been shaped far less by the worthy dissident than
by the likes of the Jehovah's Witnesses with their "astonishing
powers of annoyance, "9 Brandenburg and his fellow Klansmen, 10
4

N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). References to the "Miller standards" incorporate
glosses from other cases. E.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
5

6
Justice White's opinion of the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurrence. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the result without opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice Stevens also wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment.
7
Although I have not conducted an exhaustive search, the only cases that come to mind
are Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
u.s. 568 (1942).
8
Because of the doctrinal focus of this article, I do not deal extensively or critically with
the underlying evidence relating to the nature of the child pornography industry. Welldocumented discussions can be found in Protection of Children Against Sexual E.xploitation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (I 977); Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. Rep. No. 438, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODECO:-!G. &AD. NEWS40; Shom·lin, Prermthrg
the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535 (1981); Note,
Child Pomography Legislation, 17 J. FA:\1. L. 505 (1979); Comment, Preyirrgon Playgromrds: The
Sexploitation of Children in Pomography mrd Prostillltiorr, 5 PEPPERDI:-IE L. REV. 809 (1978);
Note, Child Pomography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711; Note,

Protection of Childrm from Use in Pomography: Toward Constillltional arrd Errforceable Legk·lation,

12 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 295 (1979). Additional materials from the medical and social sciences
are cited in Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3355 n.9.
9
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1941). E.g., Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
u.s. 444 (1938).
10
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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Cohen's tasteless jacket, 11 and Frank Collin and the American Nazi
Party. 12 People such as this have prevailed under the First Amendment not because what they in particular had to say furnishes the
raison d'etre for free speech, but b'ecause they have been the fortunate beneficiaries of a desire to preserve long-run First Amendment
values by looking not at isolated instances of speech but at broad
categories. 13 They have benefited as well from a great reluctance,
even in the face of extreme cases, to permit First Amendment
protection to tum on the determination by any official body, even a
court, of the comparative worth of particular utterances. 14
Thus we must look beyond the unique repulsiveness of child
pornography to locate an explanation for the Court's unanimity.
And what appears on closer inspection of Ferber is a growing consensus within the Court on a doctrinal proposition of great importance in First Amendment theory-that the diversity of communicative activity and governmental concerns is so wide as to
make it implausible to apply the same tests or analytical tools to the
entire range of First Amendment problems. This premise provides
the impetus for making First Amendment doctrine more precise
and at the same time more complex, developing tools and tests that
are greater in number but consequently applicable to increasingly
smaller categories of First Amendment issues. And as the size of the
categories shrinks, it becomes less necessary to protect that which
ideally ought not be protected solely to ensure the protection of the
potentially valuable.
From this perspective the virtues of subdividing and thereby
11

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977)(Stevens,
]., as Circuit justice, denying stay); National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie,
432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436
U.S. 953, cert. dmied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
13 See Scanlon, Freedom of Expressiott and Categories of Expressio11, 40 U. Plrr. L. REV. 519
(1979); Schauer, Categories a11d the First Amendment: A Play it1 Three Acts, 34 VA:-ID. L. REV.
265 (1981); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 915, 960-61 (1978). For an interesting philosophical contrast to the
prevailing legal view, see Dworkin, Non-Neutral Principles, in READI:-IG R-\WLS 124 (Daniels
ed. 1975).
14
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Chicago Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle i11 the First Ammdmmt, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone,
Re:>"trictio11s of Speech Because of Its Content: The Pewliar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). Cf Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections 011 the Supreme
Court's Balatlcittg Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL.
REV. 3 (1955).
12
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codifying the First Amendment seem great. But equally important
factors militate against the pull toward smaller categories and more
precise tests. Extreme subdivision of the First Amendment
magnifies the risk that an increasingly complex body of doctrine,
even if theoretically sound, will be beyond the interpretative
capacities of those who must follow the Supreme Court's leadprimarily lower court judges, legislatures, and prosecutors. 15 Complex codes may generate numerous mistakes when applied, and
First Amendment mistakes are more likely to be mistakes of underprotection than of overprotection. 16 Ferber, in carving out yet another distinct category of material unprotected by the First Amendment, and for reasons that are relatively novel in First Amendment
theory, is a significant milestone on the road toward elaborate
codification of the First Amendment. At the same time it may warn
us of the dangers of going much farther.
Although I want to focus on these doctrinal implications of Ferber, that is no excuse for ignoring the case's more immediate importance. Child pornography is a matter of great current concern, and
Ferber establishes the framework for a likely wave of new legislation
and litigation. I would be remiss to leap into broad doctrinal speculation without first paying attention to the need for specific analysis
of these beginnings of a discrete body of constitutional law relating
to child pornography. Justice White's majority opinion in Ferber
admirably anticipates many of the issues that are likely to arise in
its application. That precision and predictability, however, is a
product of the Court's willingness to carve out a separate category
for child pornography. Thus we cannot completely divorce the
particular analysis of the holding from its broader doctrinal premises, and a close look at how the Court treated child pornography
will greatly assist in tracing the Court's progress toward codification of the First Amendment.

I.

THECASE

Although forty-seven states and the federal government had
at the time Ferber was decided enacted legislation specifically ad15

See Schauer, note 13 supra, at 305-7.
See TRIBE, AMERICA:-! CO:-!STITUTIO:-!AL LAW 576-84 (1978); Emerson, To-ward a Gmeral Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALEL.j. 877, 887-93 (1963); Kalven, note I mpra, at
16

213.
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dressed to the problem of child pornography, 17 not all of these laws
presented the constitutional question posed in Ferber. Twelve states
directed their legislative efforts solely to the production of material
involving sexual acts by children. 18 Absent any attempt to proscribe the dissemination of the films, books, or magazines so produced, the process of photographing an illegal act for eventual
distribution creates no independent constitutional protection for
the illegal act itself. 19 The presence of a camera, a pen, or a typewriter does not clothe unprotected acts with First Amendment
protection. For example, it would hardly be a defense to a citation
for speeding on a public road that the speeding car was at the time
being filmed for an episode of The Dukes of Hazzard. Conversely,
material protected by the First Amendment does not shed that
protection merely because it depicts or describes illegal activity. 20
These twelve states thus skirted any constitutional problem by
regulating the production but not the dissemination of the material.
Fifteen other states and the federal government did prohibit the
dissemination of material depicting children engaged in sexual activity, but limited the prohibition on dissemination to material that
was obscene under Miller. 21 Because Miller-tested obscenity is
wholly outside the First Amendment, 22 these statutes also avoided
any constitutional problem under current doctrine. With only a
rational basis required for dealing with obscenity, 23 imposing special sanctions on child pornography that is also obscene presents no
previously unsettled questions.
New York, however, was one of twenty states that desired to go
further. 24 Like the previously mentioned jurisdictions, these states
17

The statutes are listed in Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2.
18Jd.
19 This is merely an instance of the more general proposition that a possible, probable, or
even inevitable First Amendment use does not immunize otherwise illegal activity. See, e.g.,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
20 So much is implicit in the view that even advocacy of illegal conduct is protected.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 {1969) (per curiam); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957).
21
102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2.
22 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 {1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
24 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2.
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banned the dissemination as well as the production of child pornography. But these states did not require that the material be obscene.
New York, for example, made it unlawful to disseminate "any
performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age. " 2 ~ Because a distinct section of the same law
provided a separate sanction for material that was also obscene, 26 it
was apparent that the first-mentioned section intended to disclaim
any necessity for a finding of obscenity.
Paul Ferber was tried for selling two films "devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys masturbating. " 27 Had he been tried
only under that section of the New York statute requiring obscenity, Ferber might have been convicted under that constitutionally
noncontroversial section. Indeed, Ferber's counsel conceded in oral
argument before the Supreme Court that a jury finding of obscenity for Ferber's wares would have been consistent with Miller. 28 But
Ferber was tried under both statutes, enabling the jury to acquit on
the obscenity charge while convicting under the section not requiring legal obscenity. 29 Perhaps fortuitously, therefore, the issue was
presented starkly: Could Ferber be convicted for selling films depicting sexual acts by children where those films were not legally
obscene?
The New York Court of Appeals reversed Ferber's conviction,
holding the statute unconstitutional primarily for want of any precedent for denying constitutional protection to nonobscene material. 30 The Court of Appeals also relied on the statute's overbreadth. Even if the 'statute might constitutionally be applied to
Ferber and his films, the statute's potential inclusion of medical and
educational materials rendered it fatally overbroad. 31

25
N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980). I use "disseminate" in place of the statute's
comprehensively defined "promote." N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.00-5 (McKinney 1980).
26
N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.10 (McKinney 1980).
21
102 S. Ct. at 3352.
28
/d. at 3365 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29
/d. at 3352.
30
People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674(1981). A federal court had previously relied on similar
reasoning to enjoin enforcement of the statute against a particular publication, St. Martin's
Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), but that decision was overturned
because the plaintiff had failed to show any real threat of prosecution. St. Martin's Press,
Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1979).
31
52 N.Y.2d at 678.
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The Supreme Court's nine-to-zero reversal of the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the facial validity of the statute as well as
Ferber's conviction under it. 32 Although Justice White's majority
opinion acknowledged that the decision of the Court of Appeals
"was not unreasonable in light of our decisions," 33 the Court departed from those decisions to the extent of allowing the states
"greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children" 34 than existed when juveniles were not portrayed. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a melange of
justifications drawn from diverse strands of existing First Amendment doctrine.
The Court began by acknowledging the "compelling" interest in
protecting children. 35 Unlike almost every other free speech case,
the focus of state concern was not on the harm that the communication would cause to its recipients or to society. Ferber contains not a
single word addressed to the effect of child pornography on its
viewers, or the effect that a proliferation of child pornography
might have on a community. Rather, the concern was for the children used in producing the material. 36
Although the state interest was therefore in the production and
not the dissemination of the material, the Court agreed with New
York that this harm could not be dealt with adequately by a restriction limited to the use of children in the production process. 37
Legislation so limited would fail to address the special harm that
came to children from knowing that there was a permanent public
record of their acts. 38 Moreover, controls limited to production

32

New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982). For the lineup of the opinions, see note 6

supra.
H 102 S. Ct. at 3352. The only courtoutsideofNew York to confront the issue had held a
similar statute unconstitutional. Graham v. Hill, 444 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Tex. 1978). Two
state courts upheld relatively noncontroversial statutes limited to production. Griffin v.
State, 396 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1981); Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981).
H 102 S. Ct. at 3354.
35 /d. On the Court's use of the particular term "compelling," see text accompanying notes
ll0-15 ilifra.
36
102 S. Ct. at 3355.
37
!d. at 3355-56.
38 !d. at 3355. The Court relied in part on the "privacy interests involved." /d. at 3356
n.10. But nothing in Ferber is helpful in determining the circumstances under which this type
of interest in avoiding publicity will be applied in the future. See Posner, The Uncertain
Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUPRE.\IE COURT REVIEW 173.

292

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1982

would likely be ineffective. Pornographic materials are produced
clandestinely, and attempting to deal with child pornography by
going after only the producers would be an exercise in futility. 39
The solution, to New York and other states, was to destroy the
market by prohibiting dissemination. The Court agreed with the
State that the unquestioned interest in protecting children from
exploitation could be served only by a restriction on dissemination.
The Court also agreed that the interest in protecting children
could not be met by a dissemination restriction limited to the legally obscene. 40 The Court correctly noted that the Miller formulation, directed toward excluding the totally worthless from the
coverage of the First Amendment, proceeds from different premises than does the concern for those who will be photographed for
films and books. The perceived dangers to the children involved
may be equally great if the material contains some serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, if it does not as a whole appeal
to the prurient interest, or if it does not as a whole offend contemporary community standards. 41 For example, a by-and-large faithful rendition of Romeo and Juliet that depicted a fourteen-year-old
Romeo engaged in a variety of sex acts with a twelve-year-old Juliet
would not be obscene under Miller, but might produce the same
harms for the child actors that were central to New York's concern.
Having accepted New York's strong interest in restricting material hitherto held to be within the protection of the First Amendment, the Court proceeded to assess the First Amendment implications of the restriction, concluding that: 42
The value of permitting live performances and photographic
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimus. We consider it unlikely
that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or
lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or
educational work .... [I]f it were necessary for literary or artistic

39

102 S. Ct. at 3356. See also TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 666 n.62.
102 S. Ct. at 3356-57.
41
!d. Influenced perhaps by the particular result at trial in Ferber, the Court implicitly
discounted the fact that most child pornography is plainly obscene under Miller. See Note,
Child Pornography, the First Amendment, and the Media: The Constitutiotrality of Super·Obscmity
Laws, 4 Cm.tM/E:"'T L.J. 115 (1981).
42
102 S. Ct. at 3357.
40
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value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.

This approach is in some tension with Cohen v. California. 43 The use
of the word "fuck" might also not have been an "important and
necessary" part of Cohen's message of opposition to the Selective
Service System, but that did not prevent the Court from allowing
Cohen to determine what method of making his statement he determined to be most effective.
Cohen may be distinguised in part because the state's interest in
protecting children against sexual exploitation seems greater than
the state's interest in protecting the public against exposure to vulgar language. But the Court relied on the fact that the type of
material employing children engaged in sexual acts is likely to be
less central to the First Amendment. Drawing support from
Young, 44 Pacijica, 45 and the defamation cases, 46 the Court reasserted
that an investigation into the content of categories of speech was an
appropriate way of determining that certain categories should be
unprotected by the First Amendment. 47 The Court therefore concluded that because the category of child pornography contained
limited speech value, and because there was a great state interest in
regulating that category, the category would be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment. 48
Thus, it is not rare that content-based classification of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that
within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests,
if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required. When a definable class of material, such as that cov403 u.s. 15 (1971).
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
45
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
46 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952). Although the Court cited Beauhamais for a methodological rather than substantive
proposition, the reference does keep alive the question of the case's vitality. See Smith v.
Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Biackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
47
102 S. Ct. at 3358. In this respect the Court perpetuated its failure to distinguish
content inquiry directed at determining the boundaries of the first amendment from content
inquiry within those boundaries. See Schauer, note 13 supra, at 290 n.114; Stephan, The First
t1mmdmmt and Content Discriminatio11, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982). But see Redish, The
Content Distinction itt First Ammdmellt Analysis, 34 STA:-1. L. REV. 113, 117 (1981).
48
102 S. Ct. at 3358.
41

44
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ered by§ 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare
of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of
competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to
consider these materials as without the protection of the First
Amendment.
It remained for the Court to specify the contours of this unprotected category. Curiously, Ferber contains no initial description of
the category itself, but it is fair to conclude that the category is
described by reference to the New York statute-material containing sexual conduct by a child. 49 Ferber's other requirements can be
viewed as qualifications or elaborations on this basic standard. First
among these is that the category is limited to visual portrayals of
sexual activity by children. In almost every imaginable case this
will be a photographic portrayal. 50 This limitation follows from the
particular state concerns involved, because a simulated or linguistic
description of sexual conduct would not involve real children in the
production. Moreover, the proscribed depictions of sexual conduct
must be specifically described in the relevant state law, and the
Court clearly had in mind a specificity requirement such as that set
forth in Miller. 51 Although the Court indicated that the same types
of sexual conduct specified in Miller would apply to child pornography, it is possible to argue that a more expansive definition of
those acts could apply to child pornography. Given that Ginsberg v. ·
New York 52 permits an adjusted application of the obscenity standard when materials are sold to children, application of Ginsberg by
49
The language quoted in the text accompanying note 48 supra supports the conclusion
that the Court intended the constitutional definition of child pornography to be coextensive
with New York's statutory definition, subject to those qualifications found elsewhere in

Ferber.
50 The exact language is "live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of
live performances." 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
51
102 S. Ct. at 3358. The relevant age must also be specified, and id. at 3358 n.17 implies
that any age up to and including eighteen would be constitutionally permissible. The same
footnote mentions, with neither approval nor condemnation, statutes that "define a child as a
person under age 16 or who appears as a prepubescent." /d. (emphasis added). Because the
Court specifically approved the use of "a person over statutory age who perhaps looked
younger," id. at 3357, this standard may raise problems. But the lack of an "appearance"
alternative might raise substantial proof problems in an action against a distributor or exhibitor. Because puberty tends to have a standard common law meaning of fourteen for boys
and twelve for girls, e.g., State v. Pierson, 44 Ark. 265 (1885), there seems nothing wrong
with an appearance alternative as long as it is sufficiently below the specified age that there
will be no deterrent effect on use of older people to simulate those more youthful.
52
390 u.s. 629 (1968).
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analogy would seem to permit an adjusted definition of the conduct
that may not be portrayed when engaged in by children. Mere
nudity is undoubtedly insufficient, but there may be some flexibility with respect to what is to count, for example, as a lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Ferber adopted two other facets of settled obscenity doctrine.
The scienter requirement of Smith v. Califomia 53 is made applicable
to child pornography, 54 and thus a defendant must be shown to
have had knowledge of the character of the materials. 55 And the
Court also made clear that it would engage in independent constitutional review of particular materials found by lower courts to be
unprotected. 56 Although commonly associated with obscenity doctrine, 57 independent review applies to the full range of material
lying just outside the borders of First Amendment protection, 58
and thus this aspect of Ferber breaks no new ground.
The resultant category of child pornography plainly bears little
resemblance to the category of obscenity delineated by Miller. The
Court in Ferber explicitly held that child pornography need not
appeal to the prurient interest, need not be patently offensive, and
need not be based on a consideration of the material as a whole. 59
This last aspect is most important, because it means that the presence of some serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific matter
will not constitutionally redeem material containing depictions of
sexual conduct by children.
The Court referred to the foregoing factors in terms of having
"adjusted" the Miller test, but that is like saying that a butterfly is
an adjusted camel. The category of child pornography is quite
unlike the category of obscenity, although in practice the materials
encompassed by the two categories will likely be similar. The dif361 u.s. 147 (1959).
102 S. Ct. at 3358-59.
55
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974). See generally SCHACER, THE
LAW OF 0BSCE.'IITY 222-26 (1976).
56
102 S. Ct. at 3364 n.28.
57
E.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
29-30 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (plurality opinion).
58
E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). Other cases are collected in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3427 n.50 (1982).
59
102 S. Ct. at 3358.
53

54
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ference in the legal description of the categories, however, will be
very noticeable in litigation. The prosecution will prevail in a child
pornography case if it proves no more than that the material contains photographic depictions of children engaged in sexual activity, that the conduct is specified in the governing statute, and that
the defendant knew the character of the materials. Under such a
simple standard, prosecutors will not have nearly the difficulties in
proving child pornography as they have had in proving legal obscenity.60
The problem with this streamlined definition, however, is that it
encompasses material that is hardly pornographic at all. Although
the Court held that the material need not be considered as a whole,
it emphasized that it was not deciding whether the law could be
constitutionally applied to serious works such as medical books or
National Geographic. 61 This potential reach of the statute suggests
overbreadth, but the Court barred Ferber from raising the claim,
relying on the "substantial overbreadth" standard of Broadrick v.
Oklahoma. 62 Because the possibility of medical book and similar
applications was so remote when compared to the constitutional
reach of the statute, the Court held the statute not to be substantially overbroad and thus not subject to a facial attack by one whose
own conduct was clearly subject to prohibition. 63
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, the majority's
approach to the substantive question made the overbreadth issue
easy. 64 By eliminating the "taken as a whole" requirement, thus
· permitting prosecution of material with some serious value, the
majority gave the statute a broad reach. Most of the space that
under a narrower holding would be overbroad was thereby filled
with constitutional applications. Overbreadth problems are likely
to arise when a constitutional rule significantly limits the reach of
60 See Project, An Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California
Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 910-25 (1977).
61

011

the Control of

102 S. Ct. at 3363.
413
601 (1973).
6 ; 102 S. Ct. at 3359-63. Ferbers restatement of overbreadth principles, as well as its
important clarification that Broadrick applies to cases other than those containing major
nonspeech elements, is more significant than my brief treatment might suggest. A comprehensive and critical recent treatment of overbreadth is Monaghan, o~·erbreadth, 1981
62

u.s.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1.
64

102 S. Ct. at 3367 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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state power. Conversely, it is hard for a statute to be overly broad if
the constitutional rule permits broad application. Justice Stevens
would have preferred a more guarded approach, delaying until it
arose the question of material with some serious value, 65 rather than
deciding in this case that the presence of some serious value would
not prevent a finding of nonprotection.
The question of serious value produced the other two opinions in
the case. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would not
permit the application of a child pornography statute to "depictions
of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic,
scientific or medical value. "66 And Justice O'Connor emphasized
just the opposite-that the Court's holding did not require New
York to except from the reach of its statute material with some
serious value. 67
Justice O'Connor's concurrence seems to have been prompted by
some ambiguity surrounding the majority's reservation of the question relating to medical books and Natio11al Geographic. But the majority's explicit holding that the material need not be taken as a
whole supports the conclusion that the presence of some serious
value will not preclude prosecution. Even this conclusion, however, leaves two situations unaddressed by the Ferber majority. In
one case a depiction of children engaged in sexual conduct might
65
/d. The desire to delay a constitutional ruling may be based on two different but often
confused rationales, elements of both of which are found injustice Stevens's opinion. On the
one hand we may wish a case-by-case approach to a particular issue, focusing on the contextual factors found in the particular case. See id. at 3366. Apart from this, however, we may
still choose a less contextual, more categorical, approach to a particular issue, such as the
serious value issue in child pornography cases, but wish to delay specific formulation of that
categorical rnle until the case arises that presents the issue most clearly. /d. at 3367. The
former approach goes more specifically to questions of First Amendment approach, while the
latter is based on more general considerations relating to the exercise of the function of
constitutional review. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). The principle of delaying a constitutional ruling until necessary, although based
on undeniably important factors relating to the role of the Court and the necessity of a good
record, is too often overestimated. The Court's role as adjudicator should not blind us to its
role as guider of lower courts and legislatures and setter of standards. See Schauer, "Private"

Speech a11d the 'Private" Forum: Givha11 v. Wertem Lim School District, 1979 SUPRE.\IE CoURT
REVIEW 217, 217-18. As the Supreme Court gives plenary consideration to a smaller percentage of the cases presented to it, as the number of lower courts increases, as the amount of
lower court litigation increases, and as there are greater delays before the Supreme Court
finally decides an issue, then to that extent the consequences of a failure to give advance
guidance become more severe. If this is true, then the Ashwa11der and related principles
should be treated more as suggestive than as dispositive.
66
102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67 !d. at 3364 (O'Connor,]., concurring).
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itself have serious value, 68 a situation to be distinguished from the
case in which a valueless depiction is part of a larger work containing value elsewhere. 69 The other and more likely case is that in
which the work is predominantly serious, rather than merely containing some serious value. 70
One way to resolve these problems would be to establish a per se
rule prohibiting without exception the use of children engaged in
sexual acts. But that solution sacrifices too much of the First
Amendment on the altar of predictability, for there are situations in
which such depictions might serve important artistic or educational
goals. 71 If and when presented with such a case, the Court should
establish a First Amendment-derived affirmative defense for such
material. 72 Under such a defense, a disseminator could avoid conviction by proving by clear and convincing evidence73 that the
material, taken as a whole, is predominantly a serious literary,
artistic, political, scientific, medical, or educational work 74 and that
the depictions of children engaged in sexual conduct are reasonably
necessary 75 to the work as a whole. This affirmative defense would
satisfy the most serious First Amendment concerns, especially with
68
Some artistic works might fit this category, as well as material dealing expressly with
the sexuality of children.
69
A clever pornographer, for example, might publish an illustrated version of the Ferber
opinion, or perhaps of this article. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
70
A serious but occasionally explicit version of Romeo and Juliet would seem to fit this
description.
71
See notes 68 & 70 supra. Where the work is not predominantly pornographic, the
humiliation-embarrassment-publicity harm seems to be less. 102 S. Ct. at 3365 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Moreover, a predominantly serious publication is not likely to be produced
clandestinely, and thus it would be easier to reach the producer for the actual practice of
using children, thus eliminating one of the Court's major justifications for permitting actions
against dissemination as well as use of children.
72
Establishing this factor as an affirmative defense, rather than part of the prosecution's
burden of proof, creates no due process problems. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558
(1982).

73
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt would give too little respect to the First Ame11dment
considerations behind the affirmative defense. A simple preponderance standard seems to go
too far in the other direction, but this estimate is subject to reevaluation based on experience
in actual trials.
74
The Court's specific mention of medical and educational works, 102 S. Ct. at 3363,
suggests that they be specifically included along with the Miller list.
75
"Reasonably necessary" is a compromise standard between "essential" and "reasonably
related." The former would get the courts too far into second-guessing literary, artistic, and
similar judgments, but the latter might be so relaxed as to be inconsistent with the major
tenor of the Ferber holding. ·
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independent constitutional review at the trial and appellate levels, 16
while at the same time not presenting the prosecution with the
major proof problems that would ensue if the prosecution were
required to prove that the material was not predominantly
serious. 77

II.

THE PATHS TO NONPROTECTION

Perhaps the most intriguing feature of Ferber is its doctrinal
ambiguity. Although it is clear that the Court was determined to
reach the result of nonprotection, it is difficult to track the Court's
doctrinal route to that destination. I use "nonprotection" in a broad
and simple sense merely as a characterization of a result: it is constitutionally permissible to restrict utterance x.in circumstances y.
But there are numerous doctrinal paths to nonprotection, and the
multiplicity of means to the same end reflects the increasing complexity of First Amendment doctrine. Ferber is the ideal vehicle for
exploring the various paths to nonprotection, because it does not
follow any one of them exclusively. Rather, the majority reaches
the result of nonprotection by almost randomly picking elements of
each of the methods the Court has at times used to justify the
conclusion that an utterance is subject to restriction. In sorting out
these multiple paths to nonprotection, we may make major progress toward understanding both Ferber and the increasingly complex nature of the First Amendment.
A. INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS OF SPEECH

Certain instances of communication may be unprotected if their
regulation is merely the incidental by-product of a more general
state interest. United States v. O'Brien 78 and the important commentary it inspired 79 have established that state interests unrelated to
76 See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra. The notion of independent review at the
trial level refers to a judge's plainly required task of withdrawing a case from consideration
by the jury if a conviction would violate the Constitution.
77 CJ. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-25 {1973).
78 391 U.S. 367 {1968). See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.S {1974).
79 Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the ·Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Ame11dmmt t\nalysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). See also TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 580601. For criticisms, to me unsuccessful, of this approach, see Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 470-74 (1980); Farber, Conte11t Regula-
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the communicative impact of the speech may presumptively be
served if no less restrictive alternative is available and if there is no
excess effect on communication in fact. 80 Determination that a restriction on communication is only incidental to a state regulatory
purpose unrelated to communicative impact is therefore one path to
nonprotection.
The Ferber majority relied on Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. ?I
for the proposition that speech may be restricted where it is an
integral part of some other plainly regulable act, but this line of
argument received little more than an en passant mention. 82
Perhaps this is best explained by the logical flaws of the speechcombined-with-action rationale. All communication has some relation with some course of conduct. Child pornography is an integral
part of an illegal act in the sense that an illegal act gives rise to the
communication and because the publication exists solely because
there is an illegal act to portray. But these cannot be sufficient
conditions for nonprotection, for were that the case then both
Pentagon Papers83 and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 84
should have been decided differently. The political content in both
of those cases may provide a distinction, but then it is a difference
in the value of the speech rather than its connection with illegal
activity that justifies nonprotection in Ferber.
If the Court in Ferber had relied on O'Brien rather than Giboney,
and therefore looked to the State's justification for regulation, this
approach may have been more fruitful. The state interest in regulating child pornography is not based on communicative impact.
The state is not concerned, for example, with whether viewers of
child pornography will as a result set out to exploit or molest children. Nor is the state concerned with the effect that viewing child
pornography might have on community environment or morals.
Rather, the state is concerned with protecting those children that
might be employed in the production process. This is an interest in

tion and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 742-47 (1980); Redish,
note 47 supra.
80
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The import ofthe commentary,
note 79 supra, is that the general O'Brien approach is not limited to symbolic speech.
81
336 u.s. 490 (1949).
82
102 S. Ct. at 3357.
83 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
84
435 u.s. 829 (1978).
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restricting commerce in a product that is created with the use of
clearly regulable noncommunicative conduct. Perhaps the most appropriate analogy, therefore, is to the use of child labor in the
publication of a newspaper, and to the question of whether a newspaper so produced could be restricted as contraband. 85 If we answer that question in the affirmative, 86 then we must ask whether
anything distinguishes the child pornography case.
One quick answer is that a regulatory purpose unrelated to communicative impact is shown in the child labor case by applications
of the statute to entities in no way involved with communication. 87
Child pornography is different because the specific sanctions, although not based on communicative impact, are limited to communication. In this sense the analogy might be to the situation
where only newspapers were subject to the child labor laws. Grosjean v. American Presi 8 now comes to mind, but Grosjean was in fact
a simple viewpoint discrimination case in which the tax was levied
solely in reaction to the particular position espoused by the majority of newspapers covered by the new tax.
Although Ferber is therefore not controlled by Grosjean, its result
cannot be justified by a simple reference to O'Brien. For Ferber as
well as Young present the special situation in which communicative
impact does not explain the state's regulatory purpose, but in which
only communication of a certain form is subject to regulation. Ferber and Young thus present an issue also lurking in the background
of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: 89 How are we to deal with
the case in which certain industries or certain formats of communication present problems unrelated to communicative impact but
still peculiar to a particular form of communication? 90 Similar prob8

s CJ. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mabee v. White
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
87
Conversely, the absence of such applications would tend to rebut an assumption that no
intent to regulate communication existed. CJ. Redish, note 47 supra, at 145.
88
297 U.S. 233 (1936). See Stephan, note 47 supra, at 215-18.
89
453 u.s. 490 (1981).
90
I would thus modify the standard distinction between viewpoint discrimination and
subject-matter discrimination to include a new and separate problem of format discrimination. The issue is presented by the question reserved in Metromedia of whether a total and
content-neutral ban on all billboards would be permissible. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. Implications of a negative answer come from Metromedia itself, id., as well as Schad v. Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). But a different conclusion might be reached regarding a
restriction of all structures of a certain size, where that restriction included all billboards as
well as many other structures.
86
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!ems would arise if it were found that child labor was a problem
only in the motion picture industry, or that newsprint contained a
toxic chemical justifying special safety precautions.
Ferber and Young are somewhat stickier in that J:he industry in
these cases is characterized not only by its communicative nature
but also by the particular nature of the communication. Here an
industry-oriented regulation is also a form of content regulation. 91
But where, as in Ferber, the state interest is not with the effect of
that content on viewers, the special dangers of content regulation
are absent, and the case is one more of format discrimination than
content discrimination. 92 Although the Ferber majority did not follow through with its suggestion that this was more a conduct case
than a speech case, it could have arrived at the result of nonprotection by concentrating more closely on the state's interest in controlling an evil unrelated to communicative impact.
B. UNCOVERED SPEECH

Under the O'Brien route, state concerns unrelated to communicative impact can produce the result of non protection. But even if the
state interest is characterized·as in some way related to communicative impact, nonprotection may be reached by determining that the
type of communication involved is totally unrelated to the purposes
of the First Amendment. 93 Some forms of speech are not protected
by the First Amendment because they are not even covered by the
First Amendment. 94 For such verbal or pictorial acts, the First
Amendment's protective devices never come into play. The noncoverage path to nonprotection justifies treating perjury, price
fixing, solicitation to nonpolitical crime, and contract law, for example, as outside the First Amendment, for these are all categories
of speech in which the state's justification for restriction is not
91
Thus the analogue to Young would be a regulation of all theaters, or all bookstores, but
based on Young's premises.
92
See note 90 supra.
93
Because I have previously discussed the matter at length, I will not repeat here the
argument that such a methodology can be intellectually justified as well as located in existing
doctrine. Schauer, note 13 supra, at 267-82; Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused? 31 PHIL. Q. 225
(1981); Schauer, Speech and "Speecb"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise itz the lnterpretatiotz
of Comtitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
94
/d. See also BeVier, note 1 supra, at 301; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First
Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUPRE.\IE COURT REVIEW 267, 278; Shiffrin, note
13 supra, at 916 n.17.
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measured against a First Amendment standard. 95 In terms of issues
actually coming before the Court, this same methodology is present
in Roth-Paris, 96 in Beauharnais, 97 and in Valentine v. Chrestensen. 98 It
is also supported by some but not all of the language in Chaplinsky. 99
Of these cases only the obscenity cases survive today, 100 but we can
nevertheless identify a methodology by which the First Amendment is relevant only in the sense that we must look to its boundaries. Once a class of utterance is determined to be outside those
boundaries, the First Amendment inquiry ends.
The Court in Ferber refers to child pornography as a category
outside the First Amendment, and its citation to Chaplinsky,
Beauhamais (!), and the obscenity cases seemingly supports the inference that child pornography is treated as totally uncovered by
the First Amendment. 101 But citations and superficial appearances
can be deceiving, and closer inspection reveals that the denial of
coverage is not the path the Court follows to nonprotection in
Ferber.
One characteristic of the classic noncoverage cases is that the
determination of lack of coverage is made solely on the basis of the
First Amendment value of the utterance itself, without regard to
possible justifications for restriction. 102 For if the utterances involved are totally unrelated to the purposes of the First Amendment, there is no need to consider, except under a rational basis
standard, why the state might want to regulate them. Ferber, how91 See generally Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 A.\1. B. Fot..~D. RESEARCH]. 645;
Schauer, note 13 supra, at 267-72.
96
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

476 (1957).
97

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

98

316

99

u.s. 52 (1942).

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). To the extent that Chaplinsky talks
about "classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem," id. at 571-72, it is consistent with the discussion in the
text. But in referring to "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and to a "slight social
value as a step to truth," id. at 572 (emphasis added), and in referring to this slight value as
having been "outweighed," id., by other interests, Chaplinsky seems of a different genre.
100
I assume that the original Chaplinsky approach is virtually unrecognizable after, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Valentine perished in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Beauhamaisin a
combination of Brandenburg and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
101
102 S. Ct. at 3358.
102
See Greenawalt, note 95 supra, at 784.
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ever, does not separate the question of speech value from the question of the strength of the state's regulatory interest. The two are
considered together, and the Court never determines that child
pornography, in isolation, is totally beyond the normative functions of the First Amendment. Moreover, the discussion of state
interest in Ferber seems premised on emphasizing the particularly
overwhelming nature of that interest, and no such showing would
be required if child pornography itself were not encompassed by
the First Amendment.
The Court's delineation of the category is consistent with the
interpretatiqn that the category is not beyond the purview of the
First Amendment. If the Court had in fact followed the noncoverage path to nonprotection, we would expect to see, as suggested in
Chaplinsky 103 and applied in the obscenity cases, a carefully delimited category whose definition was designed to ensure that only
material with no First Amendment significance was included. But
because there is no necessary connection between the harm at issue
here and total First Amendment worthlessness, 104 the category that
results from Ferber is not defined by the absence of First Amendment value. And so long as there is acknowledged First Amendment value, even if small, in the resultant category, the differences
between Ferber and the obscenity and other noncoverage cases seem
more significant than the similarities.
C. OUTWEIGHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The Beauharnais-Roth-Paris path to nonprotection proceeds from
the assumption that some utterances receive no First Amendment
protection at all. Another path to nonprotection proceeds from the
opposite assumption-that even the maximum First Amendment
protection is less than absolute. 105 Speech that is covered by the
First Amendment is not necessarily protected by it, and covered
speech will go unprotected if the state can demonstrate a
sufficiently strong reason for restriction. Although it might be pos103
104

315 U.S. at 571 ("certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of spech").

102 S. Ct. at 3356-57.
Apart from the especially stringent protection against prior restraints, which is still not
absolute, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the maximum protection
under the First Amendment is found in the less than absolute protection of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
105
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sible to construct First Amendment doctrine so that all covered
speech was eo ipso protected, 106 we have not followed this strategy of
carefully defined absolutes. Even speech at the core of the First
Amendment may be restricted if the state interest is sufficiently
strong. Although we normally associate this high but not absolute
level of protection with the Brandenburg-Hess107 formulation of the
clear and present danger standard, 108 it is possible that BrandenburgHess is representative rather than exclusive. Not every enormous
state interest can fit neatly into Brandenburg's incitementimmediacy-inevitability formula, and other versions of the general
clear and present danger formula may remain viable for special or
novel circumstances. 109
If we accept that there may be dangers so momentous as to
outweigh the First Amendment, yet not capable of characterization
in Brandenburg terms, then Ferber can be viewed as partially relying
on this "covered but outweighed" path to nonprotection. Although
the Court does not cite any cases of the clear and present danger
genre, it does describe the interest in protecting children as both
"compelling" and "surpassing." 110 It may be that "compelling"
means something less here than it does in its more established equal
protection context, 111 but it seems more sensible, especially in light
of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 112 to interpret that language
as describing a state interest equal in force but different in kind
106
E.g., E.\IERS0:-1, THE SYSTE.\1 OF FREEDmt OF ExPRESSI0:-1 (1970); Frantz, The First
1\mmdmmt i11 the Bala11ce, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Meiklejohn, The First Ammdmmt Is a11
Ab,-olute, 1961 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIEW 245; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:
Fir.-t Amendment Theory Applied to Libel a11d Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935

(1968).
107
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam). I take the two together because the force of Bra11dmburg's imminence and likelihood
requirements cannot be fully appreciated without the Hess application.
108
See generally Linde, "Clear a11d Prese11t Da11ger" Reexami11ed: Dissonance i11 the Bramlmburg
Concerto, 22 STA:-1. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty Years of"Clear and Presmt Da11ger": from
Schmck to Brande11burg-a11d Beyond, 1969 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT REVIE\\" 41.
IO? See especially United States v. The Progressive, lnc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.
1979), mandamus denied sub 110111. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed, 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Van Alstyne, A Graphic Revie'".v of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982).
110

102 S. Ct. at 3354, 3355.

111

E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1982). The suggestion in Globe Newspapers is that the "compel-

ling" interest in protecting minors might in some circumstances justify overriding First
Amendment considerations more vital than those at issue in Ferber.
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from the Brandenburg-Hess standard. Reports of the demise of De1111is
may have been premature. 113
Ferber is therefore important in hinting that interests other than
preventing disorder may justify restricting even speech at the core
of the First Amendment. But here the Court backed off. For although it has held that speech other than political is entitled to full
protection, 114 child pornography is not put in this class. Although
technically within the First Amendment, it is held to be much
closer to the fringe than the core. 115 With that determination the
Court avoided the question of whether the interest in protecting
children might outweigh speech at the core of the First Amendment, and thus the references to "compelling" and "surpassing"
interests seem more rhetorical than doctrinal.
D. LESS VALUABLE SPEECH

A final path to nonprotection recognizes that not all speech covered by the First Amendment deserves the same level of protection,
some forms being subject to control under standards less stringent
than clear and present danger in any form. Recognition of these
different levels, especially in the offensive speech 116 and commercial speech 117 cases, is one of the most important recent developments in First Amendment methodology.
Within the broad approach of identifying speech entitled to some
but not full First Amendment protection, two approaches are possi-

113
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). The first inclinations that there
were stirrings in the corpse of Dennis came from its employment in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a powerful demonstration that the current standard is the
Dennis formula subject to a clear and present danger threshold, see Van Alstyne, note 109

supra.
114

Sec Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc. 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
102 S. Ct. at 3357-58.
116
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For opposing views of this development, compare Farber, note 79
supra, with Stone, note 14 supra.
117
E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). Academic criticisms of the offensive speech developments has tended in the direction
of objecting to the use of a lower standard, e.g., Stone, note 14 supra, but most objections to
the commercial speech cases have been along the lines that commercial speech should have
remainded outside the First Amendment. E.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976); Emerson, note 79 supra; Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speec~: Economic Due Process and the First Ammdment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
115
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ble. One is to determine a priori, without reference to potential
justifications for restriction, that speech within a given category is
entitled to a particular level of protection. A test is then formulated
that applies to any putative restriction within that category. This
approach characterizes the recent commercial speech cases, with
the four-part standard of Central Hudson 118 being applied to a wide
range of possible restrictions of commercial speech.
Alternatively, a more particular test may be established by reference not only to the value of the speech within the category, but
also to a particular justification for regulating that category. It is
this approach that is seen in the fighting words cases, 119 the offensive speech cases, 120 and the defamation cases. 121 Thus the Court
has never said that all factually false speech is to be measured
against the same standard, or that all offensive speech is to be
treated alike. Instead it weighs speech value against the strength of
a particular state justification, such as that in protecting reputation
in the defamation cases and in preventing urban decay in Young. It
is tempting to follow the accepted wisdom and say that the Court
balances the interests involved, but the balancing metaphor seems
inapt, because it suggests, as with real scales, that one side simply
does or does not outweigh the other. But this does not seem completely accurate in the First Amendment context, for in none of the
cases under discussion does one interest win and the other lose.
Rather, the Court attempts to accommodate worthy but conflicting
interests in a way that both interests survive to some extent. The
resulting accommodation rule, when applied in particular cases,
will-as in defamation, fighting words, and offensive speechoften produce the result of nonprotection, but here that result flows
from a rule that is in turn premised on the determination that some
forms of speech are entitled to only partial First Amendment protection.
Once we recognize this distinction between ways of dealing with
118
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66
{1980). The wording of the test is slightly different in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981).
119
E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972).
120
See note I 16 supra. See also Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
121
E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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partially protected speech, the path followed by the Court in Ferber
becomes apparent. As with commercial speech, some offensive
speech, and some factually false speech, the Court holds child pornography to be within the First Amendment, but deserving less
than maximum First Amendment protection. Unlike the commercial speech cases, however, the Court does not take this as
justification for establishing a general rule applicable to any regulation of that category. Rather, it follows the defamation cases, and to
some extent the fighting words cases, 122 in custom tailoring an
accommodation rule to a specific state interest.
Ill. CODIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the Ferber methodology thus seems closest to that
employed in the defamation and fighting words cases, it takes some
effort to isolate this path to nonprotection from the Court's repeated references to cases and standards supporting a number of
different doctrinal approaches. In large part this process of extracting bits and pieces from different strands of First Amendment
doctrine is explained by Ferber's presentation of an issue that was
both factually and doctrinally novel. Given this novelty, it is
neither surprising nor cause for criticism that the Court felt compelled to rely on many cases and doctrines of only indirect relevance.
The product of this process was the creation of yet another comparatively distinct area of First Amendment doctrine. The rules
relating to child pornography now take their place alongside the
equally distinct rules relating to obscenity, defamation, advocacy of
illegal conduct, invasion of privacy, 123 fighting words, symbolic
speech, 124 and offensive speech. Moreover, each of these areas contains its own corpus of subrules, principles, categories, qualifi122
I refer not only to the recent cases, note 119 supra, but also to the "slight value"
interpretation of Chaplinsky. See note 99 supra.
123
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide a pure invasion of privacy case not
involving either aspects of falsity or commercial misappropriation, suggestions of a distinct
approach are found in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Moreover, a rather discrete standard of "newsworthiness" can be discerned in lower court
cases. E.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
124
The extent to which symbolic speech is a separate doctrinal category depends on
whether the Court is taken at its word in limiting the O'Brim test to cases involving symbolic
speech. See note 80 supra.
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cations, and exceptions. There are also special principles for particular contexts, such as government employment, 125 the public
forum, 126 and electronic broadcasting, I 27 and in addition we have
the pervasive tools of First Amendment analysis, such as chilling
effect, 128 prior restraint, 129 vagueness, 130 overbreadth, 131 and the
least restrictive alternative. 132 Finally, there is the additional overlay of numerous broad approaches to a First Amendment issue.
When we take all of this together it becomes clear that the First
Amendment is becoming increasingly intricate, which has
prompted one scholar to observe pejoratively that First Amendment doctrine is beginning to resemble the Internal Revenue
Code. 133 The metaphor rings true, and maybe we are moving toward codification of the First Amendment. Whether this is cause
for concern requires a closer look.
In talking about "codification," neither I nor anyone else is suggesting that the First Amendment itself should be codified. It is just
fine as written-brief, elegant, and desirably vague, while still
eloquently suggesting great strength and breadth. Nor would we
want to organize the surrounding doctrine in a form that could be.
literally codified in a way that the Internal Revenue Code is. That
approach would sacrifice too much flexibility for only a slight increase m preciSion.
It does not follow from the foregoing, however, that First
Amendment doctrine should be as simple and vague as the Amendment itself. The arguments for textual simplicity do not apply with
•

0

0

m E.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Mt. Healthy City
School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
126
See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech itt Public Places, 1974 St:PRE.\IE Cot:RT
REVIEW 233; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Fontm: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 St:PRE.\IECOt:RT
REVIEW I. The most recent case is Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
127
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
128
See generally Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Ammdmellt: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect," 58 B. U.L. REV. 685 (1978).
129
E.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
130
E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390

u.s. 676 (1968).

m See Ferber, 102 S. Ct. at 3359-64.
ll2 E.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2622 (1982); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
m Conversation with William Van Alstyne.
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equal or even any force to doctrinal simplicity. A characteristic
feature of American law is drafting simple textual instruments with
the expectation that courts will use the open-ended text as the
touchstone for creating, in modified common law style, a complex
and comprehensive doctrinal structure. 134 This feature pervades
not only constitutional law but American statutory law as well. 135
That tradition alone suggests that great complexity in First
Amendment doctrine is no cause for surprise. Moreover, taking
Schenck as the starting point, 136 we have now had sixty-four years'
experience with First Amendment problems. As time goes on situations repeat themselves. We are then more able to discern patterns,
and these patterns enable us to group recurring features into legal
rules and categories. The more we have seen, the less likely we are
to be surprised, and open-ended flexibility becomes progressively
less important. In the face of this, we must shift the burden and ask
whether there is any reason for treating the First Amendment specially in terms of doctrinal simplicity. 137
The desire for simplicity in First Amendment doctrine is often
expressed in terms of a search for "coherence. " 138 The contemporary way to praise a theory (especially your own) is to describe it as
"coherent," and coherence, in the sense of everything fitting together without inconsistencies, seems on its face to be a worthy
goal. 139 But coherence need not produce simplicity. An intricate
134

Cf LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).

Examples of simple and vague statutory languag~ that have generated enormously
complex doctrines include Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1981).
135

136
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). To take Sche11ck as the starting point
seems justifiable, but it is an oversimplification. See Gunther, Leamed H01rd a11d the Origirrs of
Modem First Amendment Doctri11e: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975);
Rabban, The First Amendment i11lts Forgotten Years, 90 YALEL.j. 514 (1981).
137
The desire for simplicity need not be unique to the First Amendment. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one Equal
Protection Clause.... It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in other cases").
138

E.g., HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 425 (1981); Emerson, note 79

supra, at 474; Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982); Stark, Book
Review, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 272 (1982).
139
Much of modern legal, political, and moral theory is based on a coherence perspective,
in the sense of assuming or arguing that all of our values do, can, or should fit together. E.g.,
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RAWLS, A THEqRY OF jUSTICE (1971);
RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971); GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). But maybe our values do not, or can not, fit together. See BERLIN, CONCEPTS
AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EsSAYS {Hardy ed. 1979); Williams, Corrjlicts of Values, in
THE IDEA OF FREED0:\1: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 221 (Ryan ed. 1979).
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doctrinal structure might still fit together like a jigsaw puzzle, with
each principle fitting neatly into the exceptions in another. 140 But
that approach requires enormous foresight to produce such precision in rules designed to govern the future. A coherent but complex
doctrinal structure, devoid of gaps or inconsistencies, attempts to
follow the model of a pure civil law system. 141 Attempting to formulate such a doctrinal system suffers from the same deficiency
that has led the pure civil law model to be only a futile dream; no
matter how carefully we define our concepts, new situations will
arise that just do not fit. First Amendment doctrine serves the
normative function of guiding future action, and we cannot incorporate into our standards intended to guide the future every contingency because we just do not know what they will be. Because "we
are men, not gods," 142 we can at best imperfectly predict the future,
and the uncertainty of the human condition places insurmountable
obstacles in the way of formulating a coherent and complete system
of highly specific norms th~t will cover every situation likely to
arise. Ferber itself is a perfect example, because the phenomenon of
child pornography is so new that it would have been impossible to
predict even ten years ago. And there is no reason to believe that
ten years from now we will not be presented with First Amendment issues that we have no way of foreseeing today.
But we should not be too quick to dismiss the search for coherence. For coherence is more commonly urged as a simple and
unitary principle of the First Amendment, 143 with more specific
rules and doctrines being no more than applications of the one
unifying principle. If the First Amendment is taken "really" to
mean x, and xis simple, we have a coherent principle by definition.
But will any single principle help in deciding cases? One would
think, after all, that that is a major purpose of the exercise.
A single principle, defined at a high level of abstraction, certainly
assists in terms of flexibility. An abstract single principle will be
140
Such a view is implicit in, e.g., BARRY, POUTICAL ARGt:~IE.'IT (1965); FRIED, RIGHT
AND \VRO:-IG (1978).
141
See BE.'ITHA~l, OF LAWS I:--1 GE.'IERAL (Hart ed. 1970).
142
HART, THE CO:-ICEPT OF LAW 125 (1961).
143
Sec note 138 supra. See also Baker, Scope of the First Ame11dme11t Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 964 (1978); Richards, Free Speech a11d Obsce11ity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Ammdmellt, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). The various theories referred to differ
in degree of complexity, but they hold in common a commitment to a single strong unifying
theme.
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able to accommodate almost any foreseeable and unforeseeable
change in the nature of First Amendment problems. But that very
flexibility is a crippling weakness, for unitary abstract principles
can also accommodate any more particularized intuition of the designer or applier of the principle. Use of a single principle to deal
with all of our problems produces application that is more likely to
be conclusory than principled.
As an example, let us take the single principle of "selfrealization," which at the moment is enjoying a good run in the
arena of First Amendment theory. 144 Faced with the problem in
First National Bank of Boston v. BellottP 45 whether to grant First
Amendment protection to corporate speech, one self-realization
theorist has argued against the result in that case because selfrealization is a right of individuals and does not apply to corporations. 146 But another, starting from the same principle, has reached
the opposite conclusion by emphasizing the self-realization goals
served by the receipt of information. 147 Similarly, self-realization
could produce opposite results in Gertz, 148 depending on whether
we focused, on the one hand, on the effect on self-realization of
being the subject of false statements or, on the other hand, on the
self-realization of the defamer in being unfettered in his communicative acts. And self-realization might lead to either of opposing conclusions about Ferber, varying with whether we focused on
the self-realization of the children or the producers. I have picked
self-realization only as an example, for a similar lack of predictive
value could be identified in any other single principle of equivalent
abstraction. 149
The problem of excess abstraction does not surround every single-principle theory. A sufficiently narrow principle could serve
the function of influencing if not completely determining the deci144
E.g., Baker, note 143 supra; Redish, note 138 supra; Richards, note 143 supra. Others
take self-realization or a very similar value (e.g., self-fulfillment) as important but not exclusive. E.g., EMERS0:-1, note 106 supra, at 6-7; TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 578-79.

145

435

u.s. 765 (1978).

Baker, Realizi11g SelfRealizatioll: Corporate Political Expmditures a11d Redish's The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982).
146

147
Redish, SelfRealizatioll, Democracy, a11d Freedom of Expressio11: A Reply to Profe.<sor Baker,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982).
148 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

149

E.g., "human rights," "liberty," and "autonomy."
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sian of actual cases. Meiklejohn's original theory was both narrow
and single-principled, 150 a feature shared by other political interpretations of the First Amendment. 151 But a precise single principle must be consequently narrow, and the problem then is that
much seems to have been left out of the First Amendment. 152
But why must we assume that the First Amendment has a
unitary essence? The First Amendment might instead be the simplifying rubric under which a number of different values are subsumed. 153 We wish to prevent government from silencing its critics,
but we wish as well to prevent an imposed uniformity in literary
and artistic taste, to preserve open inquiry in the sciences and other
academic fields, and to foster wide-ranging argument on moral,
religious, and ethical questions. This list is representative rather
than exhaustive, but it shows that the concept of freedom of speech
may not have one central core. 154 And each distinct but interrelated
foundational principle may generate its own rules of application.
Professor Thomas Emerson identifies several justifications for the
First Amendment but then argues that a single principle of application can reflect all of those diverse values. 155 But this seems counterintuitive, for if a number of diverse values are served by the First
Amendment, it would seem more likely that an equally diverse
doctrinal structure would result.
Although doctrinal simplicity is also thought to minimize the
opportunity for interpretive error, this is questionable. As the
number of available categories increases, so does the frequency of
opportunity for putting a case in the wrong category. But with this
comes a decrease in the possibility of error within a category.
Larger categories minimize the risk of picking the wrong category,
but smaller and more numerous categories lessen the chance of
judicial flexibility or manipulation within a category.
150

MEIKLEJOHN, note 1 supra.
See Bark, note 1 supra .• Professor BeVier uses strategic considerations for broadening
coverage. BeVier, note 1 supra.
151

See TRIBE, note 16 supra, at 578-79. CJ. Shiffrin, note 13 supra.
m Presumably these different values have some relationship with each other, but that

152

does not mean that there must be one unifying factor or common theme. The relationship
may be that of a "family resemblance." See WITTGE.'ISTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§§ 65-72 (2d ed. Anscombe trans. 1958).
154

See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 14 (1982).

155

E.\IERSON, note 106 supra; Emerson, note 79 supra.
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Moreover, a strategy of fewer and larger categories is likely to be
less protective of speech. If Brandenburg were applicable to utterances within the First Amendment, leaving the courts with a simple "in-or-out, aU-or-nothing" choice, recognition of some strong
interests, as we inevitably must, would leave large categories of
speech totally unprotected by the First Amendment. Defamation,
commercial speech, fighting words, and invasion of privacy, for
example, would still be on the outside of the First Amendment
fighting to get in if the only choice were to give full protection along
Brandenburg lines. 156
Categorization, in the sense of treating different forms of speech
differently, 157 thus is not necessarily speech restrictive. It is inconceivable that we will ignore such well-established governmental
concerns as safety, reputation, protection against fraud, and protection of children. If we try to force all cases within the Fir~t Amendment into some sort of a clear and present danger mold, we would
likely discover that clarity need not be so clear, immediacy not be
so immediate, and danger not be so dangerous. Certain state interests are inevitably going to be recognized, and the alternatives then
are diluting those tests that are valuable precisely because of their
strength, or formulating new tests and categories that leave existing
standards strong within their narrower range.
I do not mean that creating any new category is desirable for its
own sake. Unsound categories can be created; the "offensiveness"
category of Young and Pacifica is a prime example. 158 But taking the
creation of one bad category as a warrant to condemn all creation of
new categories is an exaggerated deployment of the already overused "slippery slope" principle. 159 Some slopes are slipperier than
others, and one of the functions of the courts is to place handholds
on the slopes for the very purpose of preventing a slide all the way
to the bottom. 160 Although it requires a bit of an act of faith, it is
156 With respect to fighting words, however, the standard that emerges after Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and its progeny has significant Brandmburg overtones.
157 On the multiple uses of the term "categorization" in First Amendment analysis, see
Schauer, note 13 supra.
158 See Gunther, The Highest Court, the Toughest Issues, STA:-.IFORD MAGAZI:-.!E, FallWinter 1978, at 34; Shiffrin, note 13 supra, at 951.
159 Overuse of "slippery slope" and "abuse of power" arguments is hardly new, nor is
reaction against it. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344-45 (1816).
160 "The power tci tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co.
v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.).
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possible to create new categories within the First Amendment
without entirely eating away the principles of free speech. A narrow but strong First Amendment, with its strong principle universally available for all speech covered by the First Amendment, has
much to be said for it. First Amendment protection can be like an
oil spill, thinning out as it broadens. But excess precautions against
this danger might lead to a First Amendment that is so narrow as to
thwart its major purposes.
From this perspective it appears likely that the Court chose the
proper approach to Ferber. Had it focused more on the "compelling" or "surpassing" interest in children and thus decided the case
along clear and present danger lines, Brandenburg might have been
diluted, with unfortunate consequences if that dilution were then
available to assess the probability and immediacy of the danger
presented by the Communist Party. And if the Court had focused
exclusively on the "noncovered" approach and decided the case
along Beauhamais-Roth-Paris lines, the current notion of virtually
complete worthlessness in a First Amendment sense might similarly have been diluted, with dangers to other forms of speech
having some but not central First Amendment value.
Ferber reflects the Court's continuing recognition of the diversity
of speech and the diversity of state interests. It is unrealistic to
expect that one test, one category, or one analytical approach can
reflect this diversity. As the First Amendment is broadened to
include the hitherto uncovered, diversity within the First Amendment increases. In addressing different problems separately, the
Court is doing nothing more than following the common law
model. Contract and tort are distinct because they address different
concerns, and changes in the world and the broadening of the First
Amendment make it likely that it will encompass problems as diverse as the difference between tort and contract. A unitary approach is likely to be both counterproductive and futile.
It is, of course, possible to go too far. Because no two speech acts
or governmental concerns are identical, categorization is in one way
artificial. 161 This would suggest an ad hoc approach to First Amendment adjudication, with unfortunate consequences. Although it is
not a necessary truth that ad hoc determinations lead to excess deference to legislative determinations of the dangers posed by speech,
161

See Stephan, note 47 supra, at 214 n.49.
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such a conclusion is empirically sound. 162 Many First Amendment
values are counterintuitive, 163 and many First Amendment litigants
are despicable individuals with ridiculous or offensive things to say.
Judges are human, and rather large categories still seem the best
precaution against First Amendment standards being eroded by the
passions of the moment.
Even without case-by-case adjudication, there are dangers in excess complexity. Doctrines can become so complex that they go
beyond the interpretive and comprehensive abilities of those who
must apply them. We should not become so concerned with doctrinal beauty at the Supreme Court level that we lose sight of the
more important role of the Court as provider of guidance for lower
courts and legislatures. 164
Doctrinal complexity inevitably requires the courts to evaluate
the relative worth of particular categories of speech. Some degree of
this is both necessary and desirable, but again we can go too far. I
remain to be convinced that there is a clear line of demarcation
between viewpoint and subject-matter discrimination, 165 because
subject-matter discrimination can, by entrenching the status quo,
be viewpoint discrimination in sheep's clothing. Excess categorization can thus indirectly increase the likelihood of viewpoint discrimination, thereby producing some of the very dangers the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.
Finally, excess categorization can reduce flexibility. Any rule or
doctrine buys flexibility with the currency of predictability, but the
converse is equally true. 166 Making First Amendment doctrine
more precise makes it easier both to decide cases and to predict the
outcome of First Amendment litigation. But that ease of decision
reduces our ability to deal with new forms of communication or
new state interests. The Ferber approach to novelty was to create a
new category, but too much precision in existing doctrine will
162 See Shiffrin, note 13 supra, at 961. Compare Gunther, In Search ofJudicial Quality 011 a
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STA~. L. REV. 1001 (1972). See generally
Bogen, Balancing FreetkJm of Speech, 38 MD. L. REV. 387 (1979); Henkin, Infallibility under
Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLt:M. L. REV. 1022 (1978).
163
See EMERSO~, note 106 supra, at 12.
164
See Corr, Retroactivity Revisited: A Case Study in Supreme Court Doctrine ''As Applied," 61

N.C.L. REV.-- (1983).
IM See Stone, note 14 supra.
166
See generally HART, note 142 supra.
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make such a course difficult. In that case the response to novelty
may be a dilution of existing standards unless there is sufficient
flexibility. If the fringe is not loose, we may discover too late that
the core has been jeopardized.
The increasing complexity of First Amendment doctrine, as
most recently demonstrated by Ferber's creation of another distinct
doctrinal category, is in itself not a cause for criticism, but rather
the inevitable by-product of broadening the First Amendment. It is
also the expected offspring of the increased sophistication that
comes from our increasing familiarity with settled factual patterns
in the First Amendment. But it is possible to become so sophisticated that we lose sight of first principles. Ferber is an especially
noteworthy step on the route to complexity. That is no cause for
alarm, but it is time to look a bit further down the road.

